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Pharmaceutical product liability and the 
Australian Consumer Law: Towards a 
principled approach 
 
Mabel Tsui 
 
A recent article following the enactment of the Australian Consumer Law has 
criticised the unnecessary existence of multiple causes of action available in 
product liability claims. An actual example of this and the problems it poses 
was observed in Peterson vs Merck Sharpe and Dohme, where the 
plaintiff pleaded five different grounds in seeking compensation for injuries 
associated with pharmaceutical use. This has triggered a call to re-examine 
the Australian product liability law landscape, with the possibility of one 
provision having a pre-emptive effect. This article serves two purposes with 
its formulation of seven principles. The primary purpose is that the principles 
may guide the future determination of pharmaceutical product liability 
claims. However, nothing precludes these principles from also being 
considered in relation to product liability lawsuits generally. A second 
purpose is that they may operate as a set of criteria against which the 
relevant ACL provisions may be assessed, to determine which provision 
might most appropriately fulfil the pre-emptive role. 
 
The context 
 
In 1989, while reflecting on the law reform process which led to the Trade 
Practices Act  1974  product  liability  provisions  as  set  out  in  Pt VA,  the 
Commissioner of the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) at the 
time, John Goldring wrote: 
 
Legislation is both the dominate source of formal rules of law, and an important 
instrument through which the power of government is exercised to implement 
policies. Policy is difficult to define, but most meaningful definitions relate it to 
priorities to be followed in the allocation of resources and to the values that 
determine those priorities. Implicitly or expressly, all laws embody some sort of 
policy.1 
 
For over 30 years until 1 January 2011, the regimes governing consumer 
protection consisted of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) and the 
equivalent state fair trading laws. On 1 January 2011, when the Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) came into full effect, Sch 2 of that Act, the 
Australian Consumer Law (ACL) superseded and replaced the TPA.2 
No doubt that while the ACL is much more streamlined and simplified 
when compared to its predecessor, it is itself a complex and long piece of  
  LLB, LLM. Correspondence: at <mw.tsui@qut.edu.au>. This article is lifted from the 
author’s PhD thesis (in progress). I thank my supervisors, an anonymous referee and Mr Jay 
Tseng for their comments on previous drafts. 
1 J Goldring, ‘Reforming Australian Product Liability Laws: Processes and Problems of Law 
Reform’ (1989) Bond LR 193 at 194 (emphasis added). 
2 Unless otherwise stated, this article will refer to and cite the Australian Consumer Law 
provisions. 
 
 
 
legislation in its own right. For this reason, and another (explained below), the 
provisions of particular interest to this article are limited to the Pt 3-2 statutory 
guarantees and the Pt 3-5 product liability provisions, as applied to 
manufacturers. This article attempts to understand the policies underlying 
these provisions as well as the consumer protection regime generally, and how 
they relate to a difficult, almost tempestuous product which we will all, at 
some point of our lives require: pharmaceutical products.3 
 
The rationale for principles 
 
To ensure the law has a principled and rational basis, as opposed to ad-hoc and 
ill-considered legislative initiatives, the basic premise of any legal 
intervention must be clear.4 A finding of liability against a manufacturer, or 
refusal to do so, must be justified on a legal as well as a policy or principled 
ground to inform interested parties why, and what a manufacturer can do to 
avoid liability in future business dealings. From a theoretical perspective, 
there is no harm in including in the discussion the values and rationales behind 
findings of liability or any other legal intervention. Indeed, such discussion 
can only serve to further guide courts when writing their judgments, especially 
where a case involves difficult or controversial facts, or where a court is faced 
with conflicting interests or objectives. Having a common, rational foundation 
also assists with harmonising judgments and ensuring consistency where 
possible, thus avoiding distinctly different outcomes where there are similar 
factual matters. A clear specification of principles is fundamental to the 
enforcement of the law. The Productivity Commission (PC) expressly 
recognised the judiciary as one body who would benefit: ‘the more clearly 
specified objectives, the more effective the guidance’.5 
In the area of product liability law, there has been concern about the lack of 
a normative framework in support of a product liability regime.6 Concepts 
such as compensation and deterrence, while noble objectives in themselves, 
have been criticised as distractions and ‘completely devoid of moral content’.7 
Economic rationales and considerations are relevant, but they are not 
sufficient. Owen points out that product liability law is also about the 
relationship between a manufacturer and a victim, and fundamental issues of 
moral philosophy are inevitably involved: 
 
By choosing to expose product users and others to certain types and degrees of risk, 
product makers appropriate to themselves certain interests in safety — in bodily  
3 I have discussed the unique difficulties and challenges that pharmaceutical products pose for 
legal and regulatory measures elsewhere; see M Tsui ‘An Analysis of Australia’s Legal 
Regime For Imposing Liability on Manufacturers of Pharmaceutical Drugs’ (2014) 21 JL & 
M 700. 
4 A J Duggan, ‘Some Reflections on Consumer Protection and the Law Reform Process’ 
(1991) 17(2) MonULR 252 at 284. 
5 Productivity Commission Inquiry Report, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy 
Framework, vol 2, 2008, p 38. 
6 R W Wright, ‘Rights, Justice and Tort Law’ in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law, D G 
Owen (Ed), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p 156; J Stapleton, ‘Bugs in Anglo-
American Products Liability’ (2002) 53 S Car LR 1225. 
7 D G Owen, ‘Products Liability: Principles of Justice for the 21st Century’ (1990) 11 Pace 
L Rev 69. 
 
 
integrity — that may belong to those other persons. Similarly, by choosing to 
purchase products with certain inherent risks or by choosing to use such products in 
certain risky ways, and then by choosing to make claims against the maker for harm 
resulting from such risks or uses, victims of product accidents seek to appropriate to 
themselves economic interests that may belong to product makers and to other 
consumers. Both situations involve important questions of how persons should treat 
one another. Ethical theory, therefore, has much to say as to whether moral 
responsibility for product accidents lies (in part or in whole) with the maker, the 
user, or the victim. At bottom, product accidents are moral events. And so the law 
of products liability should turn to moral theory in establishing its fundamental 
principles.8 
Granted, the use of any product unavoidably poses a risk to one’s bodily 
integrity. However, Owen’s comments ring true, almost in a literal sense, to 
the use of pharmaceutical drugs. Consumers and patients ingest these 
products, giving them substantial power over our bodily and biological 
integrity in their ability to simultaneously harm and heal. The challenge is to 
formulate a coherent set of principles, dedicated to guiding the determination 
of pharmaceutical product liability claims. Given that these principles 
originate from the policies behind the ACL, there is nothing to preclude them 
from being considered in lawsuits involving other consumer products. Indeed, 
this is encouraged by the author, who hopes these principles will assist 
towards a bigger and more important cause: filling the theoretical void of 
consumer protection philosophy, and ensuring that the underlying policies and 
values are not ‘just words’.9 
The problem of multiple actions 
 
Following its enactment over 4 years ago, a number of articles about the ACL 
have  been  published  on  varying  perspectives.  Some  have  reviewed  the 
operation of the statutory guarantees, contrasting them with their unofficial 
predecessors (the implied warranties and manufacturers’ liability 
provisions).10  Pt 3-5, having substantially replicated Pt VA in the TPA, also 
inherited its predecessor’s ability to draw significant academic interest in how 
it operates.11  However, these works, while very helpful in their discussion 
about the potential operation of the provisions, only focus on specific areas of 
the ACL, and do not consider the legislation and its implications as a whole. 
One particular piece of work is the exception: an article which presented 
four theories of liability (conduct of manufacturer or supplier; representations 
made; quality of the product; and safety of the product) to prove that a key 
problem of the ACL was that it was a ‘product liability morass,’ where 
multiple and overlapping causes of action could apply to the same set of facts,  
8 D G Owen, ‘The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Towards First Principles’ 
(1993) 68 NDLR 427 at 430. 
9 Duggan, above n 4, at 89. 
10 S Corones, ‘Consumer Guarantees in Australia: Putting an End to the Blame Game’ (2009) 
9 QUTLJJ 137; S Corones, ‘Getting What they Paid For: Consumer Guarantees and 
Extended Warranties’ (2011) 39 A Bus L Rev 331; J M Paterson, ‘The New Consumer 
Guarantee Law and the Reasons for Replacing the Regime of Statutory Implied Terms in 
Consumer Transactions’ (2011) 35 MULR 252. 
11 M Guihot, ‘Putting the “Personal” Back Into Injuries: An Interpretation of Part 3-5 of the 
Australian Consumer Law’ (2014) 21 CCLJ 232. 
 
 
resulting in inconsistent outcomes.12 The authors lamented on the legislature’s 
failure to even just consider the merits of a doctrine of pre-emption so that 
only one statutory cause of action would be the main basis for a class of claim. 
The authors suggested Pt 3-5 was the most appropriate cause of action for this 
purpose.13 
Their point about the problems caused by multiple grounds is valid. The 
results have been observed in a case which was handed down a few months 
prior to 1 January 2011. On 5 March 2010, the Federal Court of Australia 
handed down Peterson v Merck Sharpe and Dohme.14 In Peterson, the 
pharmaceutical drug Vioxx was held to have breached certain provisions of 
the TPA, including the manufacturers’ liability provisions and the product 
liability provisions. The applicant pleaded five causes of action in relation to 
the heart attack he suffered in the course of consuming Vioxx: negligence; 
misleading and deceptive conduct; that Vioxx was not of merchantable 
quality; that Vioxx was not fit for purpose; and that Vioxx was defective. At 
first instance, Mr Peterson was successful on two grounds out of the three, 
with Jessup J finding that Vioxx was not fit for purpose and of unmerchantable 
quality. 
The varied nature of the findings confirms the criticism made by Kellam et 
al, and the case has been criticised for similar reasons in other works.15 
However, there has been no further discussion about how the provision which 
should bestowed with the pre-emptive power should be selected, no set 
criteria put forward, or even why Pt 3-5 is preferable to Pt 3-2. What is 
required is a framework, against which the relevant provisions can be 
assessed, to determine which would be the better option. This leads into the 
second aim of this article’s seven principles: that they may act as evaluative 
instruments in  determining  which  provision  is  more  appropriate  for 
pharmaceutical products. Such an inquiry may go towards determining 
whether that provision is the more appropriate for general product liability 
lawsuits overall. 
 
The scope of this article 
 
Having set forward two justifications for the principles, this article will now 
undertake a review of the relevant reports and instruments16 to assist in 
formulating this framework, with pharmaceuticals and the Peterson case 
 
12 Dr J Kellam, S S Clark and M Glavac, ‘Theories of Product Liability and the Australian 
Consumer Law’ (2013) 21 CCLJ 1. Kellam and Nottage have made similar remarks in 
relation to the TPA regime: see Dr J Kellam and Dr L Nottage, ‘Happy 15th Birthday, Part 
VA TPA! Australia’s Product Liability Morass’ (2007) 15 CCLJ 1. 
13 Kellam, Clark and Glavac, ibid, at 83. 
14 (2010) 184 FCR 1; 85 IPR 1; [2010] FCA 180; BC201001051 (Peterson). 
15 Tsui, above n 3; C Newman-Martin, ‘Manufacturers’ Liability for Undiscoverable Design 
Flaws in Prescription Drugs: A Merck-y Area of the Law’ (2011) 19 TLJ 26. 
16 Trade Practices Act Review Committee, Swanson Report, 1976; Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC), Product Liability Report No 51, 1989; Industry Commission Report, 
Product Liability, 1990; Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992 
(Cth); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 3 June 1992, p 3372 (Michael Tate); 
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Product Liability — Where Should the Loss Fall?, 1992; 
Productivity   Commission   Inquiry   Report,   Review   of  Australia’s   Consumer   Policy 
 
 
acting as a case study. Despite Peterson involving five different causes of 
action, it was mentioned previously that this article would only focus on two 
select provisions. The first is s 54 of Pt 3-2. The second is Pt 3-5. The reasons 
for this are threefold. 
Firstly, under the ACL, out of ss 54 and 55, only the former is actionable 
against both a supplier and a manufacturer. This is by virtue of s 271. There 
is no similar provision for s 55’s guarantee of fitness for a disclosed purpose, 
which is only actionable against suppliers. In reality, any discussion of s 54 
should include s 55, as the former requires consideration of whether the 
product in question is fit for all purposes. This would presumably include any 
subjective purposes intended for the product, which is the focus of s 55. 
Second, unlike its predecessor s 52 of the TPA, s 18 of the ACL is no longer 
available for personal injury claims. Were Peterson brought under the ACL 
regime,  the  applicant  would  not  be  able  to  plead  that  the  defendant 
manufacturer’s misleading and deceptive conduct under s 18 resulted in his 
heart attack. Finally, the ground of negligence is a common law action and 
cannot be held against standards borne out of legislation. However, there is no 
reason why these principles could not be considered in a negligence action. 
Part II will review the ACL reform generally, and the relevant principles 
which underlie that regime, including information disclosure and increasing 
the consumer’s awareness of their legal rights. Part III will review the history 
of the implied warranties, the statutory guarantees, and the specifics of s 54. 
Part  IV  engages  in  a  similar  exercise  with  the  Pt  3-5  product  liability 
provisions. Part V then converts the findings into seven principles. Part VI 
makes some concluding remarks and observations. 
 
The Australian Consumer Law 
 
In 2008, the PC concluded that the ‘intrinsic case for introducing a single 
national generic consumer law’ in Australia was compelling.17 Rather than 
drafting a new law from scratch, it recommended that the starting point of 
reform be the existing TPA provisions with modifications where necessary.18 
The ACL is therefore an improved version of the TPA and state fair trading 
laws, reborn as a national consumer law regime.19  Amendments were more 
procedural or administrative in nature, focusing on the broader issue of 
consumer empowerment. The substantive policies which lay behind the TPA 
provisions remain, and are assumed to continue into the ACL unless otherwise 
stated. 
 
Access to information 
 
The  main  emphasis  was  on  consumer  access  to  information.  The  PC 
recommended a high level objective to guide the development of any future 
 
Framework, 2008; Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council, Consumer Rights: 
Reforming Statutory Implied Conditions and Warranties: Final Report, October 2009. 
17 Productivity Commission, above n 5, p 61. 
18 Ibid, p 62. 
19 Commonwealth  Consumer  Affairs  Advisory  Council,  Consumer  Rights:  Reforming 
Statutory Implied Conditions and Warranties, Final Report, October 2009, p 1. 
 
 
consumer policy framework. On 4 December 2009 the Ministerial Council on 
Consumer Affairs (MCCA)20  meeting adopted the following objective: 
 
To improve consumer wellbeing through consumer empowerment and protection 
fostering effective competition and enabling confident participation of consumers in 
markets in which both consumers and suppliers trade fairly.21 
 
In support of this, the PC set forward a number of operational objectives. 
One of these objectives was to ensure that consumers were sufficiently well-
informed, with ‘consideration of how to effectively enhance the 
knowledge base of consumers and remove any obstacles to use that 
knowledge’.22 The PC rejected an information-access approach that ‘more is 
better’.23 The key was not more disclosure per se, but better disclosure, 
designed to benefit consumers.24 The role and usefulness of disclosure 
depended upon the context and the nature of the transaction.25 Disclosure had 
to be understandable and capable of being utilised by a consumer, as well as 
communicated in a ‘clear, comparable and comprehensible manner’ which 
highlighted ‘the salient features of a product’.26 The primary purpose of 
well-written instructions was to aid the consumer, not to provide legal 
protection for the supplier or manufacturer.27 Indeed, while discussing 
decisions and disclosure in relation to purchase of financial services, the 
Commission noted: 
 
Another approach for helping to improve consumer comprehension is to reduce the 
amount of information that is sometimes disclosed to consumers at the point of sale. 
Consumers are often overloaded by disclosure documents. Detailed information 
may still be useful for intermediaries advising individual consumers and for firms 
that specialise in comparing different products from a consumer perspective. 
However there will often be better ways of delivering this information to consumers 
than in long documents provided at the time of purchase.28 
 
Access to justice 
 
There was also an emphasis on ensuring clarity and ease of access to justice 
in the law, and aiming for reductions in the cost, complexity and expense of 
claims. The PC noted that seeking redress was resource consuming, time 
consuming and emotionally stressful for consumers and businesses alike.29 
Claims should be ‘effective and efficient, . . . accessible, procedurally fair, 
proportionate, timely and accountable, have no major gaps in coverage and be 
run efficiently’.30 
 
20 Now the Legislative and Governance Forum on Consumer Affairs (CAF). 
21 Australian Consumer Law, Joint Communique, Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs, 
Australia, at <http://www.consumerlaw.gov.au/content/mcca/mcca_meetings/downloads/ 
Meeting_22_4_Dec_09.pdf> (accessed 23 March 2015). 
22 Productivity Commission, above n 5, pp 41–2. 
23 Ibid, p 262. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid, p 266. 
29 Productivity Commission, above n 5, p 193. 
30 Ibid, p 192. 
 
 
In a similar vein, another one of the MCCA’s key principles was ensuring 
that the ACL was clear and easily understood, and could be applied effectively 
by all Australian courts and tribunals. The inappropriate delineation of 
responsibilities between the Australian and state and territory governments led 
to inconsistencies, gaps and overlaps in the policy framework and its 
enforcement. Such a piecemeal approach meant that the type and extent of 
protection afforded to a consumer was partly dependent upon where they 
resided. While the PC acknowledged the benefits of regulation on a state by 
state basis;31 and the necessity of state legislation due to constitutional limits 
on federal power,32 they ultimately felt that consumer protection should be 
within the realm of the Australian federal jurisdiction.33 Trading occurred in 
much the same way nationally and a multi-jurisdictional approach led to 
unnecessary costs.34 This was rectified when the ACL was enacted, with the 
then Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs Craig Emerson 
providing some context: 
 
The complex array of 17 national, state and territory generic consumer laws, along 
with other provisions scattered throughout many other laws, must be rationalised. 
While these laws may work well for many purposes, each of them differs and that 
is to the cost of consumers and business. Australian consumers deserve laws which 
make their rights clear and consistent, and which protect them equally wherever they 
live. At the same time, Australian businesses deserve simple, national consumer laws 
that make compliance easier. A single national consumer law is the best means of 
achieving these results. Rather than relying on nine parliaments making piecemeal 
changes, the Australian Consumer Law will ensure responsive consumer laws with 
a truly national reach. A single set of statutory consumer guarantees . . . will give 
consumers clearer and more effective laws regarding their rights when buying goods 
and services.35 
 
Deterrence and innovation 
 
The PC stated that deterrence was a key operational objective. They wished to 
promote proportionate, risk-based enforcement, involving ‘the effective and 
efficient enforcement of regulations designed to encourage appropriate 
supplier behaviour’.36 In addition, both the PC and the MCCA agreed to a high 
level objective to guide consumer policy which included ‘fostering effective 
competition’ in Australian markets. Part of this would include protecting and 
encouraging innovation, thus making innovation a relevant factor. 
 
The statutory guarantees 
 
The Consumer Guarantees regime has two direct influences. The first is its 
predecessor: the manufacturers’ liability provisions. The second is the New 
Zealand  Consumer  Guarantees  Act  1993  (NZCGA).  From  the  relevant 
 
31 Ibid, p 48. 
32 Ibid, p 18. 
33 Ibid, p 15. 
34 Productivity Commission, (vol 2), above n 5, p 57. 
35 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 17 March 2010, pp 2718 
and 2720 (Craig Emerson). 
36 Productivity Commission, above n 5, pp 41–2. 
 
 
sources, we can derive the key themes as being liability and compensation by 
virtue of control, promoting legal awareness and certainty, and legal and 
economic harmonisation with New Zealand.  
The manufacturers’ liability provisions 
 
The current statutory regime replaces the manufacturers’ liability provisions, 
which were introduced in 1978. Both apply a similar statutory regime of rights 
and remedies to the manufacturer.37 As a result, the principles underlying the 
1978 reforms continue into the ACL and it is necessary to consider the 
legislative instruments when considering the ACL. 
The 1978 reforms emphasised the increased role manufacturers played in 
the production of goods. It was considered at the time that any legal 
responsibility or liability should be borne by the manufacturer, who was 
widely perceived as the party having the most control over the quality of a 
product. Modern day sealing and packaging practices had more or less 
extinguished the ability of a consumer or supplier to inspect a product prior to 
transaction, and it was fair to assume that the goods would be as they were 
when they had left the manufacturer’s premises.38 The manufacturer’s power 
over and knowledge of a product had increased, and the lawmakers became 
increasingly aware of the need to recognise this in the realm of legal 
responsibility. In 1975, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission made 
the following remarks: 
 
in the modern world . . . it is the manufacturer who plays a vital part in persuading 
the consumer to purchase his product. Many consumer goods are today sold in 
sealed containers which defy inspection, or, if available for examination, are so 
complex and of intricate design, that an inspection would convey nothing about their 
quality to the average purchaser . . . [The consumer] relies more and more heavily 
on the manufacturer and yet, the sale is not normally made through him, but through 
some retail firm. The manufacturer can make what extravagant claims he likes for 
his product but will be under no contractual liability to the purchaser for these 
promises unless he can be brought within the Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co 
principle.39 
 
In August 1976, the Trade Practices Act Review Committee published its 
report, commonly referred to as the Swanson Report. Reflecting the pro-
consumer intentions of the regime and echoing the sentiments in the NSW 
Working Paper, the Swanson Report wrote that: 
 
[as] it is the manufacturer placing goods on to the market, [they are] largely 
responsible for the quality of [those] goods. We do not accept that it is appropriate 
for liability for a breach of that statutory standard to rest upon persons other than the 
manufacturer simply because the consumer has no contractual nexus with the 
manufacturer. Of all the persons in the distributive chain, the manufacturer is the  
37 Paterson, above n 11, p 261. 
38 J Goldring, ‘Product Liability and the Conflict of Laws in Australia’ (1977-1978) 6 Adel L 
Rev 413 and 414. 
39 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Working Paper on Sale of Goods, 1975, 
at [6.3], quoted in J Goldring, L Maher and J McKeough, Consumer Protection Law, The 
Federation Press, Annandale, 1998, p 100. 
 
 
person best placed to effect appropriate insurance against such liability and 
obviously is the only person who can adjust the manufacturing process to take 
account of any persistent defects.40 
 
Liability upon the manufacturer would be concurrent with the supplier, but 
where the supplier was found to be liable, they would be indemnified by the 
manufacturer.41 
The 1978 reforms were also keen on ensuring that the injured victim 
received compensation. Part of the inquiry included questioning the adequacy 
of the then existing laws, which only provided direct statutory action against 
a supplier or seller.42 If they became insolvent, did a ‘moonlight flit’43 or could 
not be sued otherwise, the consumer would essentially be left with no 
statutory redress.44 An action in negligence against the manufacturer was 
available, but involved significant evidentiary burdens without the guarantee 
of adequate compensation.45 The 1978 reforms were frustrated by the lack of 
a contractual nexus, which barred the consumer from recovering directly 
against a manufacturer.46 The manufacturers’ liability provisions rectified this 
by providing the direct statutory link between the manufacturer and a 
consumer or any successors of title in case of breach.47 
  
The New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 
 
While the PC encouraged clarity in the law, the task of actually clarifying the 
manufacturers’ liability regime fell on the Commonwealth Consumer Affairs 
Advisory Council (CCAAC). In their 2009 report, the CCAAC recommended 
emulating the wording of the NZCGA, for its ‘simplicity and clarity’, and also 
its single set of ‘consistent statutory consumer guarantees,’48 which contained 
‘desirable features’.49 Evidence showed that New Zealand consumers 
demonstrated an understanding of and familiarity with their legal rights.50 It 
recommended that the Australian regime be amended to accommodate a set of 
consumer guarantees which could be enforced directly against a supplier or 
manufacturer. Apart from changes in nature and wording, the consumer 
guarantees do not appear to be that different from the manufacturers’ liability 
provisions: the CCAAC itself described the NZCGA being ‘more clearly 
expressed and understandable’ than the TPA, while still achieving much the 
 
40 Swanson Report, above n 16, p 76. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Part V Div 2 of the TPA regime. 
43 Commonwealth,  Parliamentary  Debates,  House  of  Representatives,  17  October  1978, 
p 1925. 
44 J Goldring and M Richardson, ‘Liability of Manufacturers for Defective Goods’ (1977) 51 
ALJ 127. 
45 Parliamentary Debates, above n 16. 
46 Swanson Report, above n 16. 
47 Ibid, p 77. 
48 CCAAC, above n 19, p 344. 
49 Ibid, p 49. 
50 Paterson, above n 10, pp 259–60. 
 
 
same effect. Section 54’s ‘acceptable quality’ was seen to be more 
immediately comprehensible to consumers and businesses, and more relevant 
to modern consumer transactions.51 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the ACL was accompanied by three 
Regulatory Impact Statements (RIS). Of particular interest is the RIS in Ch 25, 
which considered options towards implementing a national consumer 
guarantees law as part of satisfying three specific objectives.52 The first was to 
reduce legal complexity and uncertainty to assist and enable consumers and 
businesses to understand and comply with the law. This allowed consumers to 
enforce their legal rights, while businesses would benefit from reduced 
compliance and administrative costs.53 The second objective was to improve 
consumer awareness of the existence of such rights, as well as understanding 
what those rights entailed.54 The third called for effective enforcement of these 
rights. For rights to be enforceable, they must first be accessible and 
understood.55 
While accessibility and awareness of legal rights were certainly a key 
consideration, there is also evidence of a second purpose: legal and economic 
harmonisation with New Zealand. For instance, one of the terms of reference 
asked the PC about how Australia’s legal framework could go towards 
facilitating greater economic integration between Australia and New Zealand. 
The MCCA also recognised that adopting New Zealand legislation would 
align Australian law with NZ law and advance closer economic ties between 
the two countries. Closer ties with New Zealand were again alluded to in the 
second readings, with the Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer 
Affairs noting the reforms made to the consumer guarantees law ‘reconfirms 
the commitment of our two nations to a single economic market’.56 As part of 
these changes, Australian courts were expected to refer to New Zealand 
jurisprudence.57 
There is no evidence that the rationales behind the 1978 manufacturers’ 
liability provisions were rejected or affected in the regime. The switch to 
consumer guarantees appears to have been prompted more by the need for 
clarity and accessibility, rather than a change in substance.58 
The Vernon Report59 
 
While the NZCGA was not enacted as a direct result of the Vernon Report,60 
the principles stated in the report were influential in the development of the 
NZCGA. Ironically, the request for the Vernon inquiry was triggered by New  
51 CCAAC, above n 19, p 38. 
52 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill 
(No 2) 2010 (Cth), p 593. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid, p 609. 
55 Ibid, p 610. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Explanatory Memorandum, above n 16, p 179. 
58 Paterson, above n 10, p 253. 
59 D H Vernon, An Outline for Post-Sale Consumer Legislation in New Zealand: A Report to 
the Minister of Justice, Department of Justice, 1987. 
60 C Hawes notes that no legislation followed the publication of this report in ‘Consumer Law 
Reform: The Consumer Guarantees Bill’ (1992) 5 Canterbury L Rev 17 at 18. 
 
 
Zealand observing and showing interest in Australia’s 1978 manufacturers’ 
liability provision amendments. The Vernon Report advised against emulating 
the Australian manufacturers’ liability approach, preferring instead a statutory 
code which would exist independently of any contract, and imposing 
obligations which could be directly enforced against manufacturers.61 The 
principles enunciated in the Vernon Report are of significant relevance to the 
consumer guarantees regime. Despite its focus on suppliers, they apply 
equally to manufacturers. 
The Report made it clear that post-sale consumer protection laws were a 
priority, not the priority, stating that such laws should ‘intrude on the function 
of the free market only to the extent necessary to provide needed protection’.62 
In case of conflict between these two goals, consumer protection was to be 
favoured unless a cost-benefit analysis demonstrated the intrusion was so 
significant, the costs would outweigh social benefit.63 Such laws had three 
goals. The first was to encourage suppliers (and manufacturers) to provide 
goods or services that met consumers’ reasonable expectations, and provide 
relief where those expectations were disappointed. If an importer, wholesaler 
and retailer wished to benefit from the sale of a product, the product must 
satisfy a consumer’s reasonable expectations. The legislation should mandate 
accordingly.64 
The second was to incorporate the practices of responsible businesses, 
which would stand behind their goods or services, when dealing with 
consumer complaints. An example was the fact that despite enjoying a 
technical defence of the lack of privity, manufacturers recognised their 
obligations to consumers.65 This was a practice that should be codified. 
The third was a remedial system which was favourable to the consumer in 
being low cost, informal, provided rapid redress, known and understood by a 
consumer, and required legal assistance only in unusual circumstances. 
  
The product liability provisions 
 
The Trade Practices Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) which resulted in Pt 3-5 
(formerly Pt VA of the TPA) was passed amid conflicting policy objectives 
and significant legal reform in Europe. Part VA was meant to ‘introduce into 
Australia a strict product liability regime based on the 1985 European 
Community Product Liability Directive’.66 Harmonisation with European 
product liability law was a clear-cut policy objective. Australian consumers 
who were injured by defective goods were to be placed ‘in a position which 
is  no  less  advantageous  than  that  enjoyed  generally  by  their  European 
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counterparts in the same situation’,67 and as part of this, Australian courts 
were to ‘fully acquaint themselves with the emerging jurisprudence in 
Europe’.68 
While all relevant parts of the TPA warrant detailed analysis, Pt VA 
especially deserves the extra attention. This is because Pt VA was carried on 
into the ACL regime, as confirmed in Ch 12 of the Explanatory Memorandum 
for the ACL.69 Three key sources — the Australian Law Reform Commission 
Report, the Industry Commission Report on Product Liability and associated 
legislative materials — provide valuable insight into the policy objectives 
parliament hoped to achieve with these provisions. 
Acknowledging the limits to control 
 
In the 1992 product liability reforms, the reference to the manufacturer’s 
control over their goods was less explicit, but equally influential. One of the 
policies of the ALRC was that those who manufacture and supply the goods 
(and through them, their customers who use and enjoy the goods) should bear 
the risk of losses caused by what the goods did, or failed to do.70 
Simultaneously, however, the ALRC recognised there could be limits to a 
manufacturer’s control. To hold manufacturers liable on the basis of control 
also entailed limiting liability to reflect the extent of that control. When 
recommending that the development risk defence71 be included, the ALRC 
noted that in the interest of fairness, shifting the risk of loss and imposing 
liability did not extend to situations where: 
 
it is not possible for anyone to have discovered that the goods could act to cause the 
loss, however, manufacturers and suppliers of goods are in no better position than 
the claimant to assess the risk and to price the goods accordingly. Consequently, the 
policy objectives do not demand that this risk should be borne by them.72 
 
The manufacturer could only be held liable unless or until ‘the existence of the 
defect was incapable of being ascertained by any means . . . or came into 
existence after the product left the manufacturer’s control’.73 
Autonomy, choice, and unknowns 
 
The references to autonomy and exercise of choice stems from lawmakers 
emphasising the importance of disclosure to enable consumers to make an 
informed choice about the purchase and use of a product. The ALRC decided 
that a policy which matched risk with benefit would best promote 
manufacturers’ autonomy, as they alone held the best knowledge and 
understanding about the legal and economic consequences of their decisions, 
and about the risks and quality control of their product. They were also the 
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best placed when it came to discharging information disclosure obligations.74 
The Industry Commission (IC) noted the ALRC’s emphasis on information 
costs, and the crucial role information had upon the use of a product and 
product safety: 
 
The theory emphasises that liability should, in first instance, be assigned in such a 
way as to encourage the party in the position to most cheaply assemble information 
about the risk of loss to do so. Which party this will be depends on the initial 
information that producers and consumers have and the costs of gathering additional 
relevant information. The expectation is that, if liability is assigned in this fashion, 
more information will be brought to bear. This will improve decisions influencing 
product safety and the purchase and use of goods. From this perspective, the relative 
economic efficiency of different product liability regimes will therefore depend on 
assumptions made about the information available to producers and consumers. To 
the extent that producers can more cheaply assemble information about the 
characteristics of their products that may cause loss, the implication of the theory is 
that they should be made liable for losses caused by the characteristics of goods. 
Similarly, if consumers have better/cheaper access to information about the risks of 
accidents and loss arising from the improper use of products, the implication is that 
consumers (or persons advising consumers) should be liable for losses caused by 
product misuse.75 
Consumers were not easily exonerated. The IC urged a similar prudent 
exercise of autonomy on the part of consumers and users of goods.76 Where 
there was an information imbalance in favour of the consumer, thus putting 
them in a better position vis-a`-vis the manufacturer in assessing the risk of the 
goods, the latter would not be held responsible for any resulting loss from that 
risk. The consumer knew or should have known of the risk and thus, their 
actions implied acceptance of their own losses.77 The IC made this point using 
the example of pharmaceuticals: 
 
A case where this would be particularly relevant is where a drug causes an allergic 
reaction in people with a particular medical condition — it would be efficient for the 
producer to forewarn consumers of the risk and for consumers to be made 
responsible for avoiding the product if they have the particular condition, rather than 
requiring the producer to compensate any injured consumers after the event.78 
Individuals should be afforded the freedom to gamble on a product where the 
risks were yet unassessed if they felt there were greater benefits at stake: 
 
Consumers place different values on the various attributes of products, including the 
level of risk. To the extent that assigning more liability to producers requires them 
to build safer goods or to take out additional insurance, those consumers who want 
to accept higher levels of risk may be forced to buy goods of a higher price and 
quality than they would prefer. Hence, the efficiency gains of assigning liability to 
producers to improve product safety decisions need to be balanced against the 
associated efficiency losses from overriding consumers’ risk preferences.79 
Again, a pharmaceutical illustration was used:  
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AIDS patients may be willing to use the drug AZT — despite its potentially severe 
side effects — because they perceive the alternative to be certain death. However, if 
the producer was liable for any loss or injury sustained from the use of AZT, the 
producer would need to increase its price substantially to cover the liability, or 
withdraw the drug from the market. Any product liability regime that did not make 
provision for these situations could reduce economic efficiency even if it encouraged 
the parties in the best position to assemble information about product-related loss to 
do so.80 
 
One of the reasons why the ALRC and the IC were dissatisfied with the 
manufacturers’ liability provisions was because they failed to take into 
account a consumer’s contributory negligence, voluntary assumption of risk, 
or the general duty to mitigate loss.81 These factors went towards apportioning 
blame and alleviating a manufacturer’s burden of liability.82 
If a general feature of an efficient product liability regime is that the party 
better placed to bear the risk of loss should do so, then it also justified shifting 
liability to the consumer where they accepted a risk so remote that discovery 
would be unlikely before it emerged.83 Introducing a defence for unknown or 
ill-defined risks would enable this.84 The IC noted: 
 
The proposed voluntary assumption of risks defence deals only with ‘known’ risks. 
There is no provision allowing a producer to avoid liability in the case of unknown 
or ill-defined risks. The ALRC’s proposals assume that, in all cases involving 
unknown or ill-defined risks, it is efficient to impose liability on producers, thereby 
encouraging them to discover such risks. But when the risks are unknown or 
ill-defined, the benefits of allowing the consumer freedom of choice will often 
outweigh the benefits derived from imposing liability on producers. A consumer may 
want to accept an unknown or ill-defined risk far more than a producer may want to 
bear it (for example, use of a lifesaving drug with potentially severe side effects). 
Not allowing voluntary assumption of such a risk may mean that the product is 
priced prohibitively or not available at all. Under current laws, allowing consumers 
to accept such risks is facilitated, by standards of defect or negligence. . . . 
Nevertheless, if risks are so remote that investigations would be unlikely to reveal 
them, it could not be said that producers are in a better position than consumers to 
appreciate those risks. There would thus be no reason to expect efficiency 
improvements from assigning liability to producers. When account is taken of the 
legal costs of awarding compensation, liability should remain with consumers in 
these circumstances.85 
 
The right to redress 
 
The 1992 reforms were also promoted as intending to provide a ‘more 
equitable system of rights,’86 correcting the ‘inequities and injustices’ of the 
regime as it stood then and making ‘the whole process of justice for an injured 
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consumer far more understandable and achievable’.87 A key concept of the 
1992 Bill held that ‘a person who is injured . . . by a defective product will 
have a right to compensation against the manufacturer of the product’.88 Then 
Minister for Justice and Consumer Affairs, Michael Tate, stated in support of 
Pt VA, ‘We need a system which promotes economic efficiency and provides 
justice to victims who suffer loss caused by defective products’.89 The injured 
consumer would be reimbursed by the party who, ‘in modern economic 
circumstances, were regarded both morally and economically responsible for 
the quality of the goods,’ should be liable.90 
The 1992 reforms were also frustrated at the 1978 reforms being limited by 
the element of ‘consumer’ and horizontal privity. The ALRC noted: 
 
[I]n many cases . . . the very persons for whom the goods are intended and who are 
most likely to suffer loss by what the goods do will have inferior rights to 
compensation because they will not have bought or do not own the goods. The 
distinction between rights, drawn without any rational basis, therefore produces a 
differential allocation of liability for the consequences of what goods do.91 
 
In a society where many products were bought for children or other people as 
gifts, the receivers were relegated to ‘second-class citizens’ under the existing 
law.92 The 1992 reforms introduced a cause of action that would compensate 
the injured party, regardless of whether they held title, was a receiver or 
happened to be an unfortunate bystander. A manufacturer is liable to 
compensate any individual as long as that individual suffered injuries because 
of a safety defect in a product, as per s 138 of the ACL. 
  
Economic efficiency 
 
As far back as 1992, lawmakers identified the problem of multiple causes of 
action, although it was framed in terms of economic efficiency.93 Multiple 
grounds of actions available to consumers, stemming from three different 
sources of law (state, federal and common law) translated to increased costs 
for parties in determining what their rights and liabilities might be. The 
prudent consumer ‘will plead all available causes of action’94 to maximise 
their chances of success, as well as further increasing the overall cost of 
proceedings. Conversely, the administration and transaction expenses 
associated with litigation might be seen as a hindrance and deter any potential 
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claims, resulting in underreporting of the true losses caused by a product.95 In 
the case of a credible claim, this would also mean a failure to sheet liability 
home to the manufacturers.96 
The 1992 reforms were expressly intended to promote and improve 
Australia’s overall economic efficiency.97 In matching the risk of losses to the 
benefits, the ALRC hoped to promote three economic objectives: proper 
pricing; loss spreading; and optimal loss prevention (deterrence),98 as well as 
autonomy. 
Hammond has noted that it was not made clear how economic efficiency 
was intended to be achieved. Was deterrence or proper pricing the key?99 
There is an argument that deterrence appears to be the ALRC’s primary 
concern. Early in the Report, the ALRC expressly ruled out the possibility of 
introducing a general accident compensation scheme, opining that ‘a system 
of legal rules enforceable by private individuals which creates a liability to 
pay compensation’ provided greater incentives for deterrence.100 They 
continued: 
 
If the total cost of those losses is more than the cost of adding the feature, the legal 
system — in particular, compensation laws — should not provide any inducement 
to omit the feature from the goods. Rather, it should provide every incentive to 
include it.101 
The aim was to encourage the optimal level of safety.102 
The greater good 
There is support for the idea that the welfare of the general population and the 
greater good is another very relevant consideration under Pt 3-5 claims. In the 
ALRC Report, this issue was raised specifically in relation to pharmaceuticals, 
with a number of submissions noting that ‘an evaluation of the safety and 
efficacy of a pharmaceutical product inevitably involves the balancing of risk 
and benefit’.103 In discussing the definition of defect and the consumer 
expectations test in s 75AC (now s 9 in the ACL), the Attorney-General made 
an observation about balancing risk and utility. Goods were not required to be 
‘absolutely’ free from risk.104  Rather, the test is an objective standard ‘based 
upon what the public at large, rather than any particular individual, is entitled 
to expect’.105 This would include considering the nature of the product and 
community knowledge of that product. Again referring to pharmaceuticals, the 
Attorney-General said:  
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For example, there are a number of known negative side effects associated with 
certain pharmaceuticals and vaccines. It is also generally accepted and known that 
these side effects cannot be avoided. Such products are known to confer substantial 
benefits which flow to the wider community at large. The small statistical chance of 
injury associated with them does not of itself mean they are defective.106 
 
Submissions to the ALRC in support of the development risk defence 
emphasised the importance of protecting innovation and technological 
developments.107 To impose too strict a liability would inhibit product 
innovation and deprive the community of beneficial goods as well as put 
Australian goods at a disadvantage in the overseas market.108 While the 
defence was ultimately included more on the basis of fairness in loss-
allocation rather than innovation, innovation continues to be a relevant 
consideration to product liability generally. 
 
Third parties 
 
As well as taking into account consumer responsibility, the ALRC also 
acknowledged the role of third parties. Where the loss or damage was caused 
by something other than what the goods did, the manufacturer’s liability 
would be reduced accordingly.109 Apart from the claimant’s own actions,110 
there was also the wrongful actions of a third party (eg, a learned 
intermediary) during the course of supply.111 Where the conduct of these 
parties was unreasonable, liability would be reduced, and compensation 
adjusted accordingly.112 
Regulatory intervention or veto in the pharmaceutical production process 
was also a relevant factor. In cases where goods acted the way they did only 
because they complied with a mandatory regulatory standard, it was not to be 
the manufacturer or supplier who would be liable, but the Commonwealth, 
state or territory administration which promulgated that standard.113 The 
manufacturer would be entirely absolved from responsibility if compliance 
was the sole cause of injury; otherwise, they would continue to be responsible 
for part of the loss.114 If regulatory or government liability was imposed, there 
would be a ‘minor improvement’ in the incentives facing regulators to 
improve upon their work.115 
 
The seven principles 
 
Having reviewed the history and reasons behind the reforms leading to the 
ACL, the consumer guarantees regime and Pt 3-5, this part of the article now 
seeks to formulate a set of guiding principles. It will categorise the principles 
 
106 Ibid, p 8. 
107 ALRC Report, above n 16, p 48 citing J Simpson; Industry Commission Report above n 16. 
108 Ibid, p 48. 
109 Ibid, p 40. 
110 Ibid, p 41. 
111 Ibid, p 42. 
112 Ibid, p 43. 
113 Ibid, p 52. 
114 Industry Commission, above n 16, pp 27–8. 
115 Ibid. 
 
 
according to the themes identified and discuss the concepts before putting 
forward a basic principle which will guide the determination of 
pharmaceutical product liability claims. As alluded to previously, while their 
focus is on these particular lawsuits, there is nothing to preclude the reasoning 
of these principles being extrapolated to apply to other products.  
Justice and compensation 
 
There were emphatic references to ‘justice’ throughout the preceding review, 
especially in relation to Pt 3-5. Modern day product liability law has been, to 
a large extent, driven by economic principles. The thinking behind the reforms 
which led to the TPA and the ACL were in large measure no exception to this 
rule. The reference to ‘justice’ therefore entails a shift away from the 
economic literature, towards the philosophical foundations of law. 
Non-economic rationales are unavoidable in the context of tort law 
generally. A submission which focused on the economic implications of the 
law of negligence, in response to the Ipp Review, commenced with a nod 
towards the importance of morality and justice in tort law: 
 
tort law is not simply an economic phenomenon of shifting costs. Tort law and 
criminal law share a basic concept of fault. A sense of justice is written in the human 
heart, not in the statute books. If a person is injured by another’s carelessness he 
expects restitution and he has a right to do so.116 
 
All this begs the question, what does justice mean in the ACL context? The 
ACL involves a claim between at least two parties: the injured plaintiffs are 
seeking compensation from the manufacturer and/or the supplier. The 
plaintiffs allege the latter have wrongfully caused them harm or injury, and 
that they must correct that wrong. Understood in this way, ‘justice’ refers to 
corrective justice, currently the leading philosophical model of tort law.117 
Corrective justice claims are bilateral,118 between two specific parties (as 
opposed to a ‘claim to repair in the air’).119  The plaintiff must have suffered 
a wrongful harm in the course of this bilateral relationship with the defendant, 
and the defendant is held responsible. The basis on which this responsibility 
arises has varied.120 Some have argued that it is due to a causal link between 
conduct and loss.121 Another basis is responsibility of the defendant, while a 
third is the defendant being in the position of having been the cheapest cost 
avoider.122 It is beyond the scope of this article to consider what the basis 
should be; suffice to say that in the context of pharmaceutical product liability 
claims, all three would apply. To do justice is to ‘undo the injustice that the 
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plaintiff suffers at the defendant’s hand,’123 and to restore equality.124 
Corrective justice is about allocation of liability.125 
 
Accessing justice 
Having identified the concept of justice in this case, the next question is to ask 
whether civil procedural matters might prevent one’s access to justice. 
Unfortunately, two instances of hindrance can be identified. 
The first is the arbitrary doctrine of privity. There are a plethora of examples 
of how Person A purchased the product (and thus obtained legal title), but it 
was Person B who used the product and suffered the actual harm or injury. 
Privity would prove to be a substantial barrier for Person B to make a claim 
against the manufacturer if the legislation did not allow a direct claim against 
them. This is worrying when one considers the two potential classes of victims 
in a pharmaceutical injury lawsuit. The first is the patient, who has consumed 
the pharmaceutical drug. However, if we hark back to two of modern history’s 
most infamous pharmaceutical injury disasters, thalidomide and 
diethylstilbestrol (DES), we realise what makes them so distinctive was their 
teratogenic risk, which exposed the consumer’s babies (the second class of 
victims) to the toxic effects of the drug in utero. All bodies involved in the law 
reform movement agreed it was unacceptable that the second class would be 
denied relief due to a lack of privity. This transcendence of privity by the 
product liability provisions in Pt 3-5 has been praised.126 Product liability 
claims must do away with the element of privity as part of enabling access to 
justice. 
The second instance of hindrance is the existence of multiple grounds 
(discussed earlier) which resulted in procedural complexity and confusion. 
The first principle states that the operation of the ACL must facilitate 
corrective justice, by at least ensuring that avenues of redress are not hindered 
by technicalities such as privity, and enable consumers and manufacturers to 
obtain simpler, more effective and easier access to justice. 
 
Risk, control and liability 
 
As observed from the above review, a party’s extent of power is measured by 
(or even synonymous with) risk control. Whichever party has the dominant 
ability to control the risk or prevent the accident is imbued with responsibility 
for any resulting accidents or to avert any harm.127 This is reminiscent of the 
Control Principle as articulated by Thomas Nagel who observed that, ‘prior to 
reflection it is intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for 
what is not their fault, or for what is due to factors beyond their control’.128 
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It is reasonable for the public to expect the manufacturer will have 
substantial control over risk. Manufacturers determine and oversee product 
and quality standards, and are best placed to discover any hazards or defects 
in the product prior to its release onto the market.129 At first glance, consumers 
appear helpless and at the mercy of manufacturers and their decisions in 
relation to the utility and safety of the product, quality control mechanisms, 
and the release of information about the product’s risks and dangers.130 
 
The nature of the pharmaceutical industry 
As tempting as it is to reduce the pharmaceutical industry into a ‘Big Pharma’ 
stereotype, one must keep in mind how they are perceived publicly may affect 
how they are treated under the law. Howells cautions against general 
stereotyping: 
 
Producers are caricatured as being large, richer organisations, whilst retailers are 
typically thought of as being small businesses. These stereotypes are becoming more 
and more unrealistic. The number of small scale manufacturing businesses is rising 
due to the increased emphasis on self-employment and small businesses.131 
 
Biotechnology companies are a good example of how ‘Big Pharma’ is a false 
stereotype in contemporary society. Gaining traction in the mid-90s with the 
increase of new technologies, this sub-group of the pharmaceutical industry is 
significantly smaller in size, revenue and income when compared to 
traditional pharmaceutical companies.132 However, they are ‘risk-taking 
enterprises’,133 usually more willing to invest in, and innovate with new ideas 
or areas which pharmaceutical companies shy away from. A recent example of 
this was observed during the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. The 
producer behind an experimental drug which was used to treat two American 
aid workers was a small biotechnology company called Mapp 
Biopharmaceuticals.134 To impose liability on a small company, to their 
financial detriment and potentially halting their work on cutting edge projects 
is a factor against generalisation in the operation of the law. 
 
The nature of pharmaceutical drugs 
The nature and production of pharmaceutical drugs challenge many of the 
assumptions in relation to the extent of control manufacturers have. The first 
assumption is that manufacturers have full control over the nature of their 
pharmaceutical products. Stapleton points out that discoverability of the risks 
of a drug, prior to release onto the market, may not be possible due to a delay 
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of biological manifestation of adverse reactions in an individual patient.135 
Avorn points out the similarities between drug evaluation and patient 
evaluation, in that a comprehensive assessment cannot be done with a ‘once 
and for all’ approach: 
 
Evaluation of drug safety has much in common with evaluation of a patient, in that 
both are inherently Bayesian processes. Armed with an informed set of prior 
probabilities, one looks for signals. Suggested pieces of evidence are then worked up 
further, even if they do not initially offer black-and-white confirmation of 
‘significance’. Additional targeted studies are not conducted in a timely way to 
follow up on promising hypotheses. This is not a process that can be adequately 
crammed into the first evaluation of a drug any more than a thoughtful clinical 
workup can be completed in the first moments of hospitalisation or office visit.136 
It takes time for both the adverse reaction to manifest itself after release onto 
the market and the confirmation of a reasonable link between the 
pharmaceutical and that adverse reaction. By their inherent nature, drugs are 
toxic and it is ‘irrational’137 to suppose a manufacturer can alter this essential 
nature, with or without the sword of legal liability hanging over the 
manufacturer’s head. The external factor of human biology means each drug 
is likely to react differently with the physiological makeup of each individual 
patient. It is unreasonable to expect a manufacturer to account for such 
complexities. 
The second assumption is that manufacturers have full control over the 
regulation and use of their products. Even a cursory examination of what is 
involved in regulation of pharmaceutical production will undermine this 
perceived control. Newman-Martin mentions the requirement of ethics 
committee approval before trials can commence, and ethical constraints 
imposed by the committees during the trial process.138 Following testing and 
development, the industry then faces the challenge of seeking licensing 
approval from a national regulator before release onto the market.139 Upon 
release, prescription and use of the pharmaceutical product is then determined 
by a learned intermediary, usually a medical practitioner. Communications 
and decisions made between the learned intermediary and the consumer are 
not matters which a manufacturer will be privy to. It is contrary to common 
sense that a manufacturer should take responsibility for the actions of a third 
party. 
In order to understand this principle’s implications for pharmaceutical 
product liability, and to give it effect, the line of inquiry should commence 
with the question as to when a manufacturer has, or does not have control. 
Unfortunately, the legislation provides no definition as to where the line is 
drawn on this point. The statutory guarantee in s 54’s focus on the quality of 
the product provides little assistance. Better guidance comes from determining 
the  alleged  defect  the  product  suffers,  as  understood  in  Pt  3-5.  The  
135 Stapleton, above n 129. 
136 J Avorn MD, ‘Evaluating Drug Effects in the Post Vioxx World. There Must be a Better 
Way’ (2006) 113 Circulation 2173 at 2175. 
137 K H Wilson, ‘The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug 
Reactions’ (1980) 49 Fordham LR 735 at 753. 
138 Newman-Martin, above n 15, at 44. 
139 Stapleton, above n 129, at 995. 
 
 
Explanatory Memorandum to its predecessor noted that: 
 
there are a number of different types of potential defects. Design defects relate to 
matters such as the form, structure and composition of the goods. Manufacturing 
defects are those related to matters such as the process of construction and assembly. 
Instructional defects are those caused by incorrect or inadequate warnings and 
instructions. All these categories of defects fall within the meaning ascribed to defect 
in s 75AC.140 
 
Distinguishing the type of defect the pharmaceutical product is allegedly 
suffering may be the key to determining the extent of the manufacturer’s 
control. The manufacturing process is an aspect of the product where it is 
reasonable to expect that manufacturers have ‘virtually exclusive power’ 
over.141 Where a product suffers a manufacturing defect, it has failed to meet 
the quality standards as set by the manufacturer themselves,142 deviating from 
the manufacturer’s own design or specifications.143 In this scenario, the 
consumer is indeed powerless and entitled to expect the manufacturer would 
comply with their own quality standards and manufacturing process. The 
manufacturer’s control justifies the imposition of legal responsibility where a 
product is flawed or faulty in this respect. 
On the other hand, if the alleged defect is in the design of the 
pharmaceutical, there is a much more difficult question, as highlighted in the 
preceding discussion about the nature of pharmaceuticals and the lack of 
control all parties have over this aspect. While the manufacturer is responsible 
for the initial design of a drug, they are subsequently limited in determining 
the safety of that design due to state of the art considerations (which include 
existing scientific knowledge) and the biological makeup of each individual 
patient who will consume that drug. Side effects arise from the chemical 
design of a drug, and no manufacturer will ever be able to foresee entirely how 
or when a drug may adversely affect or react with each individual. The PC’s 
observation that ‘some products inherently pose risks simply because of the 
uses for which they are designed’144 applies here. A chance of injury does not 
of itself mean they are defective.145 Where the risk could not be foreseen, 
there cannot be any exercise of risk control. It is difficult to justify the 
imposition of liability in such cases. 
Last, but not least, are instructional defects, which pose their own set of 
problems. In the case of pharmaceuticals, to determine whether or not to 
include a warning requires a manufacturer to undertake a (sometimes 
complex) balancing exercise, having regard to the reasonable expectations of 
a consumer as to whether a warning should be included at the time of 
supply.146 Firstly, does the state of the epidemiological data establish a causal 
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connection between the pharmaceutical and the adverse reaction?147 Secondly, 
even if a causal link is not certain, the gravity of the adverse reaction would 
be a relevant circumstance in deciding whether to include it in the warning 
label.148 Thirdly, even if a side effect was known, and a warning thus 
theoretically feasible, there are a number of practical reasons why a warning 
may not be included.149 For instance, it may be expensive and provides no 
increased incentive for risk control, rendering such an exercise impractical, 
unfair and unachievable.150 Finally, one must  take into account the 
intervention of regulatory bodies and their requirements or amendments. Like 
the design defect, it is difficult to justify imposing liability on a failure to warn 
in circumstances where the contents and context of a label is not necessarily 
within a manufacturer’s exclusive control. 
The second principle states that the legal responsibility and liability of the 
manufacturer must reflect the extent of control they have over the particular 
aspect of a pharmaceutical. One way of determining the extent of control they 
have is to categorise the type(s) of defect the product is allegedly suffering. 
 
Information and autonomy 
 
Information disclosure 
The issue of information disclosure is strongly related to the principle about 
control. If a party is to be held accountable for actions, choices or decisions, 
it is due to principles of freedom and autonomy,151 which are limited only by 
a duty to respect the rights of others.152 To facilitate responsible and informed 
decision-making on the part of the consumer, manufacturers are obliged to 
compensate for any information asymmetric by making full and honest 
disclosures about their product and its associated risks. Consumers are entitled 
to expect such disclosure, to enable them in turn to exercise their choices as 
to purchase and use of the pharmaceutical product. Knowledge is power, and 
the truth shall make consumers free.153 However, even Owen concedes that 
absolute ‘truth’ is an unattainable ideal, for the limitations on human 
perception and cognition mean we can, at best, only obtain a ‘fair 
approximation’ of what is true.154 
A starting principle is to hold manufacturers accountable for harms caused 
by incorrect or incomplete warnings, where the manufacturer either knew or 
should have known or reasonably foreseen that misuse would occur as a 
result. This would acknowledge the importance of providing accurate and 
useful knowledge, which the consumer can utilise in a constructive way to 
make an informed decision about purchase, use or misuse of the product. 
However, manufacturers and lawmakers must also be wary of information 
overload. ‘There was a fable once about crying wolf, but it apparently went 
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unheeded when the modern warning doctrine was being framed’.155 In 
attempting to protect consumers, we must ensure that disclosure do not cause 
more harm than good: 
 
Of course it makes sense for the manufacturer of a lawn mower or potent drug to 
alert users to the risks. But warning is such an obvious and attractive concept that 
insufficient warning has become a catchall rationale for liability when no other 
comes readily to mind. This has been carried to the point where tort law now presses 
hard for warnings that go into mind-numbing detail and overstate actual risks. An 
excess of detail undercuts the value of the warning in practice; to warn of everything 
is to warn of nothing, and in a torrent of new data the really crucial bits of 
information are likely to go unread. Overstatement is worse still. An overly lurid 
warning that causes a man with hypertension to put aside a prescribed medication, 
or an older, overweight woman to reject an IUD and go back to the pill or a mother 
to forgo vaccinating her young child, can cause considerably more harm than the 
omission of a warning of some obscure side effect that does occasionally 
materialise.156 
 
It is not absolute, but reasonable disclosure, which would ‘enhance individual 
autonomy, control, and free choice’ and lead to a safer world.157 
 
Autonomy and risk 
Where a reasonable warning has been provided, and an injury arises, the fact 
that the consumer made an informed choice must be taken into account. 
Consumers should be responsible for the consequences of their own actions, 
where they chose to abuse their power or their own human dignity.158 To allow 
compensation would deny the equality and autonomy of other stakeholders, 
including other consumers, the manufacturer and the manufacturer’s 
shareholders. The latter group has invested their savings in an enterprise on 
the basis of safe and normal use of its products; ‘such persons cannot in moral 
theory be required to subsidise, through higher prices and lost profits, the 
selfish and morally irresponsible consumer,’159 and the consumer cannot 
morally force others to bear the consequences of his or her own autonomous 
actions.160 
However, the law must not tilt the balance and burden the consumer with 
individual responsibility to such an extent that it acts to immunise 
manufacturers and remove or erode incentives to improve and continue with 
product safety efforts.161 ‘Knowledge should be regarded as relevant to, but 
not decisive in, the attribution of responsibility for the damage’.162 Knowledge 
and choice on the part of the consumer per se should not allow the 
manufacturer to escape liability. 
The law and industry cannot pander to every subjective, unreasonable 
expectation of a consumer. Where the law has made way for such expectation, 
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it has been criticised. An example is the consumer expectations test, currently 
adopted by s 54.163 Where an individual has an idiosyncratic aversion to risk, 
there is no moral reason for the law to compensate the individual.164 
Thankfully, most consumers hold fair expectations, understanding and 
accepting that the trade process inevitably involves trade-offs.165 Voluntary 
assumption of risk is evidence of that willingness to trade-off. In exchange for 
a lower price (or in our case, in exchange for the potential therapeutic benefits 
of the pharmaceutical product), the burden of responsibility then lies with the 
consumer.166 Some consumers happen to have a greater preference than the 
manufacturer or other consumers for risk.167 The ACL must ensure it does not 
shift the focus away from an individual’s need, want, consent, acquiescence, 
responsibility and control. To do so ‘is dangerous’.168 
 
Minimal requirements 
The ACL (or any product liability regime) should ensure that the law in 
relation to warnings or failure to warn promotes a practice where consumers 
are informed of genuine or the principal dangers of a product, while avoiding 
over-warning or providing speculative, volatile informational content that is 
constantly being revised.169 Some minimal requirements towards formulating 
a satisfactory warning might include: 
1 Content is sufficient to give the reasonable user an indication of its 
dangers, without understating or underestimating the risks;170 
2 Manufacturers should take into account the possible misuses which 
the product may be applied to, and update the warnings to reflect 
such misuse;171  and 
3 Where a causal connection is confirmed between the risk and the 
product, and the risk cannot be eliminated, the warning must include 
this risk or (depending on the severity or acceptability of that risk) 
the product should be taken off the market.172 
 
Translating this into principles of liability 
Warnings and instructions are the gateway to making an informed choice 
about risk and loss. Autonomy and information disclosure raises three issues: 
the manufacturer’s ability to disclose and how much disclosure can or should 
occur; the consumer failing to be informed of the risks; and the problem that 
is posed by the ‘unknown-unknown’ risks. 
First, in determining whether a warning is defective and the manufacturer’s 
degree of liability, the law must take into account the balancing exercise 
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manufacturers face in deciding what content to include in their warnings, as 
well as any external limits imposed by regulatory bodies (as flagged above in 
relation to risk control). Where information would have been included but for 
regulatory intervention, the manufacturer may have a strong argument that 
responsibility should lie with that regulatory authority instead. 
Second, the law must also encourage the consumer to exercise their 
responsibility and common sense. The allocation of liability should reflect any 
failure to do so. In a case where the manufacturer’s instructions are 
satisfactory, and injury arose due to the consumer’s failure to comply with the 
instructions, loss should lie with the consumer. Similarly, where a consumer 
did not take into account or inquire about risks of multiple drug interactions, 
responsibility would more likely lie with them or a learned intermediary who 
is familiar with their prescriptions, such as a doctor or pharmacist. 
Where the manufacturer knowingly provides false information, liability is 
justified. Even where a manufacturer innocently provides false information, 
the fact that they may benefit from this false information, at the expense of the 
consumer’s health and safety, justifies liability.173 The difficulty in 
determining who is accountable lies in the ‘unknown-unknowns’, the risks 
unforeseen by both parties, and neither has the power nor control to prevent 
the risk.174 The difficulty of unknown-unknowns is highlighted by the 
comments of a former US Secretary of Defence: 
 
Reports that say something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as 
we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also 
know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we 
do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we 
don’t know. . . . It is the latter category that tends to be the difficult one.175 
 
Responsibility then does not lie with the manufacturer, nor the consumer, but 
rather the product or the inadequacy of science, technology or knowledge.176 
Reasonable consumers (should) understand that unknowable risks will 
accompany the benefits which ‘result from manipulating the atoms of the 
universe’.177 In such cases, the consequences may ultimately depend on 
fortune and lady luck. Ferguson notes that warnings can only alert patients to 
the possibility that ‘they may be one of the unfortunate few who will be 
harmed by the drug, leaving them to determine whether or not to take the 
risk’.178 The victim of such an accident ‘probably should have no claim’ 
against the manufacturer.179 Unless there are good reasons to the contrary, loss 
would lie where it falls: on the consumer. 
The third principle states that a party who has the best understanding of the 
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risks and benefits inherent in using the product should bear the burden of 
liability.180 
This principle can be broken down further into three components. First, 
manufacturers are obliged to disclose information about the foreseeable risks 
of the product. This shows respect for the consumer’s dignity and autonomy 
in relation to decisions about whether and how to use the pharmaceutical. 
Second, the law must take into account consumer autonomy, and an individual 
consumer’s informed choice to accept a known risk. Finally, the law must 
acknowledge that in certain circumstances, the knowledge of both parties will 
be limited. In this case, there is some support for the proposition that loss 
should lie with the consumer. 
 
Economic efficiency 
 
Economic performance is a crucial concern in formulating product liability 
policy,181 and the Australian statutory product liability provisions were no 
exception to this rule. As part of the 1989 ALRC’s inquiry (related to Pt 3-5) 
into product liability law and whether it was economically efficient to shift the 
burden of loss onto the manufacturer or supplier, they commissioned a report 
by economist Richard Braddock, who undertook a general economic analysis 
of the reforms and its potential impact.182 Components of economic efficiency 
included deterrence and the mechanism of proper pricing. The economically 
ideal legal system ‘produces the required outcome at the lowest cost to 
society’,183 where costs included both pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors 
such as pain, suffering, inconvenience or lost opportunities.184 The optimal 
ideal in product liability is achieved when the sum of the costs of the defect 
and the sum of the costs of avoiding the defects is minimised, resulting in the 
lowest burden on society overall and the optimal level of defect avoidance.185 
Achieving this optimal level of defect (and therefore injury and loss) 
avoidance requires incentives for all relevant parties to avoid such costs.186 
Manufacturers must be provided with incentives to produce safer products, 
and provide adequate information and education for consumers to make 
accurate and informed choices.187 This optimal level also requires laws which 
were clear, enforced and effective to enable compliance, as well as involving 
minimal legal and administrative costs in ensuring or enforcing 
compliance.188 
In 1993, a report by US economist Steven Garber undertook an economic 
analysis of the effect of then existing US product liability laws on the 
pharmaceutical  and  medical  device  industry.189   Garber  adopted  a  similar 
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approach, holding that laws had to be economically efficient: did they produce 
social benefits which outweighed the social costs of a pharmaceutical product 
or device.190 There were four components to economic efficiency: availability 
of products, proper pricing, product safety, and effectiveness and 
innovation.191 
Both reports had their specific topics. Braddock was tasked with analysing 
the economic efficiency of the ALRC’s product liability laws, which aimed for 
prevention and compensation, on the business industry as a whole. Garber’s 
report focused on the economic impact of US product liability laws on the 
pharmaceutical industry specifically. This article acknowledges the existence 
of Braddock’s work, but adopts Garber’s approach as it is directly relevant to 
this article’s topic. 
 
Component 1: availability and deterrence 
The effects of product liability on the availability of a product can include 
‘product withdrawal, delay or failure to market, and various ways to mitigate 
liability risks while marketing’.192 What we need to ensure is that liability 
does not produce such a burden upon manufacturers to the point that an 
otherwise socially beneficial product, or one which enjoyed the approval of 
the medical community, is withdrawn from the market or no longer available. 
Garber acknowledges that liability is not the sole reason behind a decision to 
remove or refuse access to a product; usually such a decision arises from a 
combination of market, regulatory and liability forces.193 The key is to 
identify where liability may have played a crucial role in that decision.194 
The idea behind deterrence is that any loss prevention or risk reduction 
measures selected be optimal and practical, not maximum or absolute in 
nature.195 Manufacturers generally would not incorporate safety features 
which are prohibitively expensive and price the product out of the market, or 
which would result in an overall decrease in the product’s efficiency.196 
Liability should act to incentivise manufacturers to incorporate optimal loss 
prevention measures, assuming that the manufacturer understands what the 
risks are and have the ability to eliminate them, and provided the cost of 
deterrence is cheaper than the expected accident cost.197 
The key to ensuring liability is not imposed indiscriminately in the name of 
deterrence is to remember that the aim of deterrence is to deter wrongful 
behaviour and the release of defective products, not all products. The law 
should have a strong deterrent effect which targets wrongful behaviour, while 
encouraging socially beneficial actions such as innovation.198 As Owen writes, 
‘what society should morally seek to deter is not the production of products 
generally, but rather the production of defective products, products that are by 
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some measure bad’.199 One example of the law having an impact on this issue 
is causation. Garber notes that difficulties in establishing legal causation or 
unfairly attributing causation can undermine attempts at deterring undesirable 
behaviour or exacerbate deterrence of desirable behaviour.200 To ignore the 
process which results in a product being found to be defective may result in 
the deterrence rationale losing its moral and practical force, or the introduction 
of excessively deterrent measures, impacting on the availability of useful 
products to the detriment of consumers.201 Misinterpreting the deterrence 
strategy could also backfire, resulting in disincentives for the manufacturer to 
conduct any quality testing or research, as they may think, ‘I am liable 
anyway!’202 The law’s aim should be to increase the likelihood of liability for 
actions where social costs outweigh their social benefits; and conversely, 
decrease the likelihood of liability for behaviour that is economically and 
socially desirable, such as the development of vaccinations.203 
Deterrence assumes control and foreseeability204 on the part of the 
manufacturer. A principled theory of deterrence should take into account the 
extent of a manufacture’s knowledge or ability to know their product.205 The 
manufacturer is not likely to be deterred from selling a product that reasonably 
appears to be ‘good’ in circumstances where, despite their best attempts, the 
manufacturer cannot discover any unknown-unknowns. It would generally be 
unfair if a business was held legally accountable for harm they did not intend, 
and could not foresee nor prevent.206 Hammond has suggested strict liability 
would be the most efficient mechanism to achieve deterrence from the 
manufacturer’s end.207 Owen’s point that the manufacturer must know in order 
to be deterred rejects that premise. Strict liability fails to recognise the limits 
of a manufacturer’s knowledge. In the context of pharmaceutical product 
liability, an efficient application of the deterrence strategy would involve 
inquiring into how much control a manufacturer has, both over the nature, use 
and marketing/pricing of their product, in finding that the product was 
defective. Where the defect is one the manufacturer had control over, and it 
fails the risk/utility test, there is a strong argument that the manufacturer could 
have, but failed to, incorporate optimal loss prevention measures, justifying 
the imposition of liability as part of the deterrence strategy. 
Consumers must also be encouraged to take precautions. Where consumers 
have failed to do so, the manufacturer’s liability must be reduced to reflect the 
extent of that failure.208 There is some doubt about the necessity of using 
reduced liability to encourage consumers to exercise care, as self-interest and 
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a natural drive to protect oneself from harm should be incentive enough.209 
However, contributory negligence has been acknowledged as one way to 
ensure fairness in the proceedings.210 For the sake of reducing administrative 
costs, Wright suggests that this be a complete defence,211 but to make it so 
would defeat the principles of corrective justice and compensation. A case-
by-case treatment of contributory negligence as a defence may be the 
better approach. 
 
Component 2: Proper pricing 
To properly price a product, the price must reflect ‘all costs associated with its 
production’, including the ‘cost of raw materials, overheads and a profit 
margin . . . [and] the expected accident cost of a product’.212 
Proper pricing rests on three rationales. The first is accident prevention: 
assuming that consumers underestimate the risk of products, proper pricing 
would force them to take account of the full cost, thus purchasing fewer 
numbers of this product, which should result in less use and fewer injuries 
overall.213 A price increase acts as a price signal to guide consumers in 
determining whether to purchase a product.214 An alternative to not 
purchasing the pricier product is to purchase cheaper alternative such as 
second-hand counterparts, which are inferior in quality and may possibly lead 
to an increase in accidents.215 
In the pharmaceutical context however, there are two weaknesses to this 
stance. First, purchasing a cheaper alternative would most likely occur in the 
form of purchasing a generic equivalent, which, assuming it is as safe as the 
brand name medication and properly labelled, is uncontroversial. Pricing does 
not act as a reliable signal as to the safety of the product. Second, this 
assumes, somewhat controversially, that the consumer-patient has a choice in 
deciding whether to purchase a pharmaceutical product. Very often, the 
purchase of pharmaceutical products is not a choice, but a necessity. A doctor 
is usually decides for the patient whether the medication is necessary, but they 
do not pay for the medication.216 In addition, when it comes to certain types 
of medication, there may only be one particular product suitable for that 
particular illness: there is no alternative, suitable product. The ‘choice’ to 
purchase has, by this stage, become illusory and accident prevention through 
proper pricing becomes an irrelevant consideration. 
The second rationale is the spreading of loss, where proper pricing assumes 
that the manufacturer is best placed to do so. Loss spreading involves shifting 
liability ‘from the victim to those who have a better capacity to spread the loss 
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over many parties, thereby diluting the social impact of the loss’.217 In the 
context of pharmaceutical product liability and the Australian environment, 
the manufacturer’s ability to spread the loss is undermined by the fact that 
prescription pharmaceuticals prices are controlled,218 so that the manufacturer 
and its shareholders would not be able to practice proper pricing. In addition, 
they are then financially disadvantaged if they are unable to pass on these 
costs to the consumer-patients. 
Third, proper pricing assumes that the costs and expenses related to 
research, development and potential accidents can be neatly quantified and 
packaged into a final price sum. In reality, this is not possible. First, as 
discussed previously, manufacturers are limited in their ability to quantify 
potential accident costs as they are unable to foresee many potential accidents 
which may arise. Second, in the context of pharmaceutical drugs, part of the 
research involves clinical testing on humans. This, Wilson notes, involves a 
non-monetary, human cost, as the true effect of a drug on a human can only 
be determined by testing it on humans. ‘There is a human cost that falls 
primarily on the incarcerated, the indigent, and the ill.’219 It is also a type of 
cost that manufacturers would not be able to factor into the price of any 
product. 
 
Component 3: Safety and effectiveness 
Issues relating to safety and effectiveness are dealt with in other principles and 
mentioned here for completeness sake. Garber notes that ‘injuries from 
product use are among the major social costs of drugs and devices and are the 
fundamental economic rationale for product liability’.220 Unlike the 
availability and pricing components however, Garber also notes that they are 
unobservable and intangible.221 In his report, Garber adopted US Food and 
Drug Administration regulations as the standard against which safety and 
effectiveness is measured, and studied whether liability encouraged 
satisfactory or excessive compliance with these regulations.222 Liability must 
encourage compliance, especially on aspects of design and testing, as well as 
the provision of safety information to doctors and patients. 
 
Component 4: Innovation 
Related to the first component (product availability) is the issue of innovation, 
and the effects of liability possibly deterring innovation and development.223 
Innovation involves two steps: research and product development, and market 
introduction.224 In the economic performance of the health industry, Garber 
gives the most weight to innovation, noting that ‘effects on innovative effort 
may be the most important element of the effects of liability’.225  No doubt 
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innovation was an important element for Australian lawmakers in the product 
liability reform debate, based on the number of defences available under 
Pt 3-5. 
While it has not occurred in Australia, the explosion of tort claims and their 
negative effect on innovation and industry which has been observed in the US 
confirms that the potentially inhibitive effect of liability on innovation is not 
mere hyperbole. Rising costs lead to unpredictable risks, which in turn lead to 
unavailable or unaffordable insurance. Where companies were once willing to 
be innovative, knowing they had the security of liability insurance protection, 
they are no longer so willing.226 The pharmaceutical industry, unsurprisingly, 
has not been immune from the effects of this explosive growth in claims. In 
1989, reflecting on the explosive growth of litigation, the US Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association noted: 
 
If it works properly, the tort law system not only compensates those who are 
wrongfully injured, but also provides incentives that encourage proper conduct. 
Today, however, the tort law system has broken down. New theories have created 
uncertainty about  what conduct  will result  in liability.  Because  of these 
developments, insurance underwriters have no way to predict the kinds or amounts 
of claims they may have to pay. The result: broad classes of liability insurance are 
now unavailable or unaffordable.227 
 
The American Medical Association was much more direct: 
 
Innovative new products are not being developed or are being withheld from the 
market because of liability concerns or inability to obtain adequate insurance. 
Certain older technologies have been removed from the market, not because of 
sound scientific evidence indicated lack of safety or efficacy, but because product 
liability suits have exposed manufacturers to unacceptable financial risks.228 
 
Lasagna notes that as well as the expenses of research and development, the 
risk of being found liable for damage claims related to untoward effects of 
pharmaceuticals would naturally affect profit returns.229 Garber’s report 
suggests that where the product has a large profit potential, profit as an 
incentive may outweigh future liability as a disincentive. On the other hand, 
if a product has more social value (such as a vaccine), but is less profitable, 
then the effects of liability will be more obvious and likely.230 Garber cites 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that liability could result in decreasing 
incentives to innovate in an environment where large liability costs are 
plausible and financial disaster becomes a real possibility.231 This would most 
likely be the case for a pharmaceutical product deemed defective in design or 
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warning, as a finding of defect in one product will result in that entire batch 
being affected. 
Even Australian commentators fear the impact of strict product liability 
upon prescription drugs: 
 
Strict liability might reduce the incentive to innovate and produce cutting-edge 
drugs. Drug manufacturers invest in research and development because they have a 
chance of profiting from the sale of new products. The R&D costs associated with 
new drugs constitute a higher-risk investment than investment in most other 
consumer products: it costs between US$500 million and US$2 billion to bring a 
new pharmaceutical product to the market and only 1/3 of drugs will ever cover their 
development costs through sales. Requiring manufacturers to bear the financial 
burden of undiscoverable flaws in new products reduces the financial incentive to 
invest in new drugs.232 
 
Industry and businesses are not the only stakeholders adversely affected by the 
inhibition of innovation. Society also pays a price, in the form of being unable 
to access, or access in a timely manner, life-saving products. Manufacturers, 
fearing liability, may shy away from release of new or experimental 
medication, even where benefits potentially outweigh the risks, to the point 
that consumers will be harmed by the withholding, rather than the release of 
the drug.233  In a 1978 Arizona product liability case, Gaston v Hunter,234  the 
following observation was made: 
 
Essentially, there are two risks involved in the development of new drugs: (1) the 
risk that unforeseen, perhaps catastrophic, injuries will result because a new drug is 
used in man too soon; and (2) the risk that needless human suffering and death will 
occur because a beneficial drug is withheld from mankind for too long. Absolute 
liability for the adverse effects of new drugs would enlarge the latter risk to 
unacceptable proportions, while giving a remedy only to those injured by the former 
risk.235 
 
The pessimistic outlook is summarised in an observation made by Herbig and 
Golden, who hypothesised that if a company was able to develop an AIDS 
vaccine, it would ‘no doubt’ be withheld from the public until the company 
was reassured that they would be protected from potential product liability 
lawsuits.236 
Garber also notes that ‘uncertainty and risk are often emphasised in 
discussions on the effects of liability on innovation’.237 One key element 
towards alleviating the negative effects of liability would be for a legal regime 
to provide legal certainty where possible, or at least minimise legal 
uncertainty and risk. One way to do so might be to make liability 
consequences more ‘predictable’.238 
As much as it can do so in the context of a product which is uncertain in  
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nature, the ACL should operate to impose liability to provide this legal 
certainty, or predictability, and reassure manufacturers that they would not 
face a multitude of unreasonable claims merely because they released an 
unknown, but innovative and potentially beneficial pharmaceutical product 
onto the market. 
The fourth principle states that pharmaceutical product liability law should 
encourage economic effıciency by ensuring that the social benefits resulting 
from liability will outweigh the social costs, with respect to these four 
components. 
 
Developing a risk/utility principle 
 
Two justifications for a risk/utility balancing exercise 
Before delving into the specific principles which may guide the determination 
of any risk/utility analysis in pharmaceutical products liability matters, it is 
worth addressing some of the literature which has questioned the need for 
such an analysis. For instance, Richard Epstein has asked: if a defendant has 
carried out their obligation to warn, why should the defendant be later 
required to further justify and defend their decision with respect to a product? 
 
No longer is it sufficient to say that the defendant informed the plaintiff of the 
hazards involved. Instead it becomes necessary to go behind the consent of 
consumers by finding expert testimony to reconstruct their past decisions from the 
ground up.239 
 
Epstein’s objection is based on the idea of acceptance of risk by the consumer, 
an idea which was acknowledged and accepted in principle 3. However, as 
mentioned previously, the key to such acceptance lies in the consumer having 
made an informed choice. Yet, as demonstrated in principle 2, a warning of 
absolute truth is impossible, and a product purchase choice will rarely be 
one-hundred percent fully informed. In addition, the design defect aspect of 
safety acknowledges that the manufacturer is in a stronger position vis-a`-vis 
a consumer; and that a consumer has no choice but to hope the manufacturer 
has chosen an appropriate chemical design where the utility and benefits really 
do outweigh the risks. Seen this way, compensation for injuries arising out of 
design defects remain a necessary part of consumer protection measures. 
Another argument for a greater emphasis on risk/utility consideration is one 
that the pharmaceutical industry may find agreeable. The Australian 
Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) adopts this test in determining 
whether to approve a pharmaceutical product for the market.240 To equate the 
legal test with the regulatory test would go towards easing the manufacturer’s 
onus of proof, minimising confusion and increasing legal and regulatory 
certainty. This also opens an argument (which is beyond the scope of this 
article) as to whether courts are the right adjudicators of fault to begin with. 
As Huber writes: 
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Devising or endorsing such standards of good design practice was the mission of 
many of the regulatory agencies that proliferated in the 1960s and early 1970s. . . . 
Agencies set thousands of safety standards for foods, drugs, cars, heart pacemakers, 
aircraft, pesticides and much else. . . . The line between the dangerous weapon and 
the useful tool is thus one that experts in pharmacology, engineering, medicine, and 
chemistry draw all the time. They do so, on the basis of years of careful work and 
painstaking evaluation. The process lacks the theatre of the courtroom, but what it 
lacks in spectacle it makes up in sober, well-considered judgment.241 
 
Even the Vernon Report, which emphasised prioritising consumer protection 
above community and industry, appeared to endorse a risk/utility approach 
when it stated that protection goals must be counterbalanced by considerations 
of the wider social benefit.242 While the ACL’s adoption of consumer 
expectations as the main test may appear to go against the risk/utility 
approach, it must be remembered that under risk/utility, consumer 
expectations are not disregarded. Rather, they become a factor, as opposed to 
the factor determining liability. 
Despite the rhetoric about utility and defectiveness, there does not seem to 
be any substantive guidance in the ACL as to how one quantifies the 
characteristics to perform this balancing exercise; or what is the minimum 
threshold of utility before the risks of a product become acceptable. 
Section 9(2) of the ACL provides a list of matters to be considered in 
determining safety, but these are mostly related to the characteristics of the 
product, which are only part of the inquiry. Again, we are required to refer to 
external sources for guidance. This also brings in a third justification for the 
risk/utility approach. If Australian lawmakers are serious about efforts towards 
global legal harmonisation (addressed in principle 7 below) it is necessary to 
consider what other jurisdictions are doing differently. 
 
Wade’s seven factors in determining risk/utility 
In the United States, the risk/utility test is the preferred approach in 
pharmaceutical products liability cases. Professor John Wade’s seven 
risk/utility factors243 is the authoritative test.244 In Ortho Pharmaceutical 
Corporation v Heath,245 the Supreme Court of Colorado was asked to 
determine whether the oral contraceptive Ortho-Novum was defectively 
designed. In expressly adopting Wade’s seven factors, the court noted: 
 
The dangerousness of Ortho-Noveum 1/80 is defined primarily by technical, 
scientific information. The consumer expectation test fails to address adequately this 
aspect of the problem. The risk-benefit test focuses on the practical policy issues 
characteristic of [this] product, which is alleged to be unreasonably dangerous 
despite being manufactured in precisely the form intended.246 
 
The following discussion will formulate a risk/utility test for Australian 
pharmaceutical product liability cases based on Wade’s seven factors, but  
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tailored to reflect the legal context of the ACL, as well as incorporating 
Miller J’s ‘acceptable quality’ factors from the NZ case Contact Energy Ltd v 
Jones.247 
Wade’s first factor states that usefulness and desirability is not only to be 
considered from the perspective of the user, but also the public as a whole. 
Unlike the current consumer expectations test, which focuses on the 
reasonable consumer’s expectations of safety, the risk/utility test focuses on 
the characteristics of the product against a public setting. Consideration of the 
public’s needs would also mean taking into account how urgently the product 
was needed, and how life-threatening the illness or condition was.248 Public 
health and timely access to medicine was among the rationales for the 
development risk defence: that from a pharmaceutical industry as well as a 
patient well-being perspective, the law had to balance the risks of a new drug 
which had high therapeutic value (and may be associated with a high risk of 
injury) against the risk of suffering or death if a drug was withheld from the 
market for too long.249 In these circumstances the court may find there was no 
reasonable entitlement to the usual level of safety.250 
Wade’s second factor considers the safety aspects of the product, the 
likelihood that it will cause injury, and the severity or seriousness of that 
injury. A similar consideration was raised by Miller J in Contact Energy, 
holding that ‘acceptable quality’ included considering the nature and extent of 
any risk posed by a given fault; the extent and duration and frequency of the 
fault; and at which point it became unacceptable.251 In Kearl v Lederle 
Laboratories, the court held that in determining whether a vaccine was 
designed defectively, the gravity of danger posed by the challenged design and 
the likelihood of that danger occurring were relevant considerations.252 The 
severity of the injury is also relevant: a minor side effect of a life-saving 
medicine may be tolerable.253 A manufacturer can compare the degree of risk 
against the cost of excluding it; but they cannot compare it against the cost of 
compensating those who may be injured.254 
Wade’s third factor asks if there is a substitute product available, whether 
the substitute would fulfil the same needs or purpose without the defective 
aspect. In Kearl v Lederle Laboratories, the court held that the mechanical 
feasibility of a safer alternative design and any adverse consequences to the 
product’s efficiency or to the consumer resulting from that alternative design 
were relevant.255 In Toner v Lederle Laboratories256 (where vaccinations were 
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again the offending product), the court added an additional element: that at the 
time of distribution, no feasible alternative design existed which would have 
fit the purpose with a lesser risk. 
Wade’s fourth factor looks at the manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the 
unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it 
too expensive to maintain its utility. Modification of a chemical composition 
of a drug can result in a totally different drug, which might have its own side 
effects.257 The price of the product and the price the consumer would have to 
pay to improve the design or eliminate the defect and whether the consumer 
would be willing to pay that price are also relevant considerations.258 
Wade’s fifth factor looks at the user’s ability to avoid danger. In the context 
of pharmaceuticals, short of not taking the drug, there are limits to what a 
consumer can do. Basic requirements would include exercising due care, 
choosing an alternative product with a less toxic or adverse side effect, being 
aware of their own medication regime in order to minimise the adverse effects 
of medication interactions and finally, heeding all warnings. As Lavelle wrote, 
‘if the danger is unnecessary, the product regardless of its utility is defective. 
If the danger is unavoidable and utility is great, liability may be avoided with 
proper warnings’.259 
This leads into Wade’s sixth factor, which asks what would a consumer be 
entitled to expect, anticipate and understand about the dangers inherent in the 
product and their unavoidability? The risk/utility approach does not disregard 
consumer expectations; rather consumer expectations are subsumed into the 
balancing exercise. This would include general public knowledge and 
understanding of the product, and the expectation that because representations 
made about the product would affect such knowledge and understanding,260 
warnings about any inherent or unusual side effects should be included. 
Wade’s seventh and final factor considers the feasibility on the part of the 
manufacturer in spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or 
carrying liability insurance. If the price of prescription pharmaceuticals is 
controlled,261 the manufacturer would be financially disadvantaged as they are 
unable to pass on these costs to the patients. There is also the element of 
human cost involved in pharmaceutical drug testing which cannot be 
translated into financial figures. 
The fifth principle states that in determining whether a product is of 
acceptable quality or defective, the ACL should adopt a risk/utility approach 
which incorporates the reasonable consumer’s expectations test. 
 
The role of third parties 
 
Traditionally, and due to direct-to-consumer advertising restrictions in 
Australia, pharmaceutical companies provide medical practitioners and/or 
suppliers with the relevant product information, rather than to the consumer 
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directly. This may have an impact upon whether a product is instructionally 
defective.262   Liability allocation must accord with the ethical notion that 
innocent people should not suffer through fault or misconduct of another.263 A 
corresponding argument would be that the other should only be liable to the 
extent of their fault or misconduct. This is certainly a policy consideration that 
Australian lawmakers have emphasised strongly. A manufacturer cannot be 
found to be at fault for a defective warning or incomplete instructions if the 
manufacturer had informed the medical practitioner of the relevant risk, and 
the medical practitioner failed to inform the consumer.264 To hold otherwise is 
not only unfair, but may hinder consumer protection as there is no incentive 
upon the other parties involved in supply to exercise the necessary due care.265 
Pharmaceutical product liability claims must take into account the role of 
doctors and pharmacists who act as the mouthpieces of the manufacturers. 
In   Australia,   the   regulatory   authority   is   the   Therapeutic   Goods 
Administration, which administers the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth). 
Section 4(1)(a) of that Act sets out the relevant objective as establishing and 
maintaining  a  national  system  of  controls  relating  to  the  quality,  safety, 
efficacy  and  timely  availability  of  therapeutic  goods  which  are  used  in 
Australia. Under s 25(1)(d), where an application is made for the registration 
of therapeutic goods, those goods will be evaluated having regard to the 
good’s quality, safety and efficacy, and the purposes for which the goods are 
to be used. As the Administration wields substantial power over the approval 
process,   their   role   must   be   acknowledged   in   the   determination   of 
pharmaceutical product liability claims. There is an argument that evidence of 
compliance with regulatory codes or industry practice is strong evidence of 
meeting the standard of care.266  Product liability law may consider allowing 
a manufacturer to argue the regulatory compliance defence. At the very least, 
the law should take into account any regulatory limitations or restrictions 
which may go towards exonerating the manufacturer for breaching the ACL 
provisions. 
The sixth principle states that pharmaceutical products liability law must 
acknowledge the role third parties play in the regulation, production, sale, 
supply, and use of the pharmaceutical products. This can be achieved by 
reducing the manufacturer’s liability to reflect the extent and nature of the 
third party intervention. 
Promote legal harmonisation 
 
Kellam and Nottage have criticised Australian legislatures who base consumer 
policy and laws on ‘domestic political expediencies’, despite the increasing 
globalisation of both markets and policy making processes.267 A review of the 
Australian case law on pharmaceuticals and product liability confirms the 
suspicion that Australian courts have taken quite an insular approach when  
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determining claims under the TPA, especially in relation to Pt VA/Pt 3-5. A 
more comparative take should be encouraged, with Australian courts looking 
especially towards overseas jurisdictions which have also domestically 
implemented the EU Directive. 
However, as with any comparative law exercise, care must be taken in 
considering how another country’s laws may influence the operation of the 
ACL. This part flags two issues of note about the New Zealand and German 
legal regimes. In relation to the NZCGA, while the reforms which led to the 
ACL statutory guarantees were undoubtedly based on good intentions and 
further the cause of consumers understanding their legal rights, Australian 
lawmakers appear to have overlooked one significant issue. Unlike the ACL, 
the NZCGA does not apply to personal injuries. This significant difference 
between the two regimes questions the extent to which the principles of 
compensation and recovery from New Zealand can be extrapolated and 
applied to a consumers guarantee regime which does account for personal 
injuries. 
Similarly, the extent to which the German implementation of the EU 
Directive, known as the Produckthaftungsgesetz can assist with Australian 
pharmaceutical product liability lawsuits is debatable. This is because it does 
not apply to personal injuries arising out of the use of pharmaceutical 
products; these are instead governed by a separate Drug Law regime, known 
as the Arzneimittelgesetz. 
The seventh principle states that when applying the ACL provisions to 
pharmaceutical product liability lawsuits, Australian courts must have regard 
to the developments, trends and judicial approaches from comparable 
jurisdictions. This is to promote the goal of legal harmonisation. 
 
Final thoughts 
 
On 26 February 2015, despite some reservation about the adequacy of the 
compensation amount, Jessup J approved an amended settlement agreement 
whereby $497,500 would be distributed among 1660 group member 
claimants, with what each individual member could receive being capped at 
$4,629.36.268 The Vioxx saga, ‘which has been before the Australian courts for 
the best part of [a] decade’,269 had finally ended, but claims in relation to 
pharmaceutical product or medical device injuries will doubtless continue to 
arise in the near future. 
In New Zealand, due to the existence of a general compensation scheme 
(now the Accident Compensation Act 2001), the NZCGA is limited to other 
types of remedies, namely, repair, replacement, refund of the purchase price, 
and repayment of reasonable out of pocket costs resulting from any default. It 
was mentioned previously that the ALRC had rejected the implementation of 
a  compensation  scheme.  Perhaps  recognition  of  the  problems  posed  by 
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Australian product liability laws generally may highlight the need to reignite 
a discussion about the merits of such a scheme to be applied to personal 
mishaps arising out of pharmaceutical use. 
In his capacity as the ALRC Commissioner, John Goldring remarked: 
 
The first necessary step in any law reform exercise is to determine what the existing 
law is, and to evaluate it in terms of simplicity and comprehensibility and internal 
consistency. Unclear or internally inconsistent laws are undesirable, as they lead to 
confusion and uncertainty which can only be resolved through time consuming and 
expensive litigation.270 
 
In an area such as product liability law, which affects almost every member of 
the population as well as the business and productivity sector, certainty and 
understanding of one’s legal rights and obligations is especially important. 
The recognition that Australia’s product liability regime as a ‘product liability 
morass’ is an important first step towards much needed reform. The main 
objective of this article is to further this discussion by suggesting how such 
reform might occur. It is hoped that these seven principles, as applied to one 
of society’s more difficult products, will act as both a guide as well as a 
platform for the discussion to continue. 
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